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Three years ago, some 2,000 academics in Turkey, signed the Peace Petition, a 
document that calls for cessation of the extreme acts of violence and destruction 
perpetrated against Turkey's Kurdish citizens in the eastern part of the country and for 
resuming negotiations between the state and Kurdish leaders, interrupted six months 
earlier. The Petition was met with extreme rage on behalf of the Turkish government. 
Since then, persecution of the petition signers has intensified and their circumstances 
have deteriorated. They have been subject to severe measures, resulting in a continuous 
state of uncertainty regarding their future. They are among tens of thousands of Turkish 
citizens who have been similarly persecuted, questioned, imprisoned or dismissed from 
their jobs while being accused with various accusations ranging from support of 
terrorist propaganda to treason. In view of the daunting distress of the petition's 
signatories, the organization that initiated it, Academics for Peace (AfP) (Barış için 
Akademisyenler), has evolved into a network of support and solidarity with the 
signatories. AfP mobilizes material support for those who were fired from their work. 
In addition, AfP publishes online information on the related trials and about the teaching 
and research work that the signatories continue to undertake in extra-academic forums.  
This essay addresses the struggle of this group of academics, whose members are not 
deterred by the heavy personal price they may incur for protecting the principles of 
equality, democracy, freedom of expression and abstention from violence. Armed only 
with solidarity and their conscience, they confront the authorities fearlessly. It is not an 
academic article. Rather, it is my account of the still ongoing ordeal to which the 
Turkish state is subjecting the signatories of the peace petition, of the courageous civil 
struggle they are waging as individuals, and of their inspiring group solidarity. 
   
  
Introduction 
In January 2016, AfP, an organization of academic activists, which at the time 
comprised only several hundreds, held a press conference, in which it published a 
petition signed by 1,128 of their colleagues, including researchers, professors and 
doctoral students, who work or study in over sixty universities across Turkey and 
worldwide.  We will not be a party to this crime (Bu Suça Ortak Olmayacağız) the 
signers of the petition declared, calling upon the Turkish government to stop the harsh 
oppressive acts that the Turkish army had been taking since summer 2015 against 
Kurdish citizens in east Anatolia. The petition also called to resume the negotiation that 






had been taking place several years earlier between the government and Kurdish 
organizations regarding their demands for recognition of their political and cultural 
status in Turkey and for a peaceful resolution of the prolonged conflict between the 
state and its Kurdish citizens. 
As soon as the petition was out, hundreds more signed the petition adding up to 2,200 
signatures. As a result, the signatories became a target of detentions, tracking, police 
questionings, raids and searches of their offices. Additional measures included 
suspension and dismissal from work, denial of pension rights and welfare and 
healthcare services, denial of access to employment in the public sector and seizing of 
their passports. Following the suppression of the attempted military coup against 
President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in July 2016, the persecution and harassments against 
the signatories and many other Turkish citizens have aggravated further. Many faced 
criminal indictments in which they were accused of disseminating terrorist propaganda. 
Trials began at the end of 2017, some of which concluded with imprisonment sentences 
while others are still underway. 
As a scholar of Ottoman history, I have often traveled to Istanbul for research and 
academic conferences. During these visits, I have established professional relationship 
with Turkish colleagues. Over the years, some of them have become dear friends. Like 
other scholars of the Ottoman Empire and Turkey, I too have been following the recent 
developments in Turkey with a growing concern, often alarmed by reports on the 
suffering and abuse experienced by my friends and colleagues (as well as their friends 
and colleagues). Their only fault was their willingness to take a humane initiative, 
calling for cessation of the violence against the Kurdish citizens of Turkey. Since the 
beginning of the trials against the signers of the Peace Petition (December 2017), news 
has been accumulating on the arbitrary nature of the legal proceedings taken against 
them. Growing evidence show that the petition signers have been feeling increasingly 
isolated from the world despite gestures of support and identification on behalf of 
academic organizations outside Turkey. Some of the petition signatories describe their 
own situation as “social death” following dismissal from their jobs accompanied by 
restriction of movement. These testimonials clearly convey the importance and urgency 
of covering the trials in media outlets and sparking international attention and action 
around the struggle of the petition signers.  
In addition to my interest in learning and spreading the facts about the political 
persecution of friends and colleagues in Turkey, this essay is related to my field of 
research, namely socio-legal history of the Ottoman Empire. Scholars who specialize 
in this field understand the legal arena as a dynamic social and political, often chaotic, 
space. The law as they conceive it is a locus shaped by all members of society (not just 
jurists), with implications on the social relations and legal culture. 
The Ottoman Empire boasted a rich and intricate legal culture during its protracted 
existence. In the 'long' 19th century, the last Ottoman century, the Ottoman political elite 
generated profound legal reforms aimed at transforming the Empire into a modern 
centralized state while preserving its characteristics as a diverse, multi-ethnic society. 
We will never know whether the Ottoman reforms might have had the power to save 
the empire from disintegration, or whether they were bound to fail, as argued by many 






historians after the fact. We only know what had happened in practice. Assuming that 
what did not happen could not have happened in the first place is a fallacy, but it is 
nonetheless a common assumption. At any rate, the Ottoman Empire (like other 
empires) did not survive and the transition from an empire to the nation states of the 
Middle East was a process accompanied by dramatic changes with far-reaching 
consequences. The current reality in Turkey, in the Middle East, and in fact in the entire 
world reflects some of these consequences. In this context, the reports from Istanbul on 
the criminal charges filed against the petition signers give rise to questions on the 
consequences of the transition from empire to nation state in Turkey. In particular, I 
wonder how this transition influenced the Ottoman legal system with which I am 
familiar and which the Turkish nation state inherited from the Ottoman Empire.  
I should also note that while I was often tempted in the course of writing this essay to 
mention similar developments and phenomena in countries other than Turkey 
(including my own country), I decided to avoid this temptation and to focus on the 
group of signatories, highlighting their actions and reactions in response to their 
treatment by the Turkish regime. 
 
I. The State and the Kurdish Minority in Turkey 
As noted above, the political harassment of the signatories intensified following the 
publication of the Peace Petition. In July 2016, Erdoğan succeeded in suppressing an 
attempted military coup d'état and instated a state of emergency (the lifting of the state 
of emergency recently did not signify a shift to more lenient treatment of the signatories 
or other critics of Erdoğan's rule). Hiding behind the formal state of emergency and the 
Anti-terrorism Law No. 3713, Erdoğan has been stretching the concept of "rule of 
law" ad absurdum. The Anti-terrorism Law defines as treason, subversion and support 
of terrorist propaganda any action or expression of opinion, which in democratic nations 
is classified as "freedom of thought and expression" and is recognized as a basic human 
right. In this context, in addition to their professional and academic status, the 
signatories of the Peace Petition are part of a huge group of Turkish citizens who since 
2016, have been suffering from similar abuse: dismissal from work, interrogations, 
political trials and imprisonment. Tens of thousands of men and women in Turkey – 
including military personnel, state officials, teachers, jurists and journalists – are 
accused of being accomplices to the attempted coup d'état, of supporting Erdoğan’s 
nemesis Fethulla Gülen, or simply of supporting terrorism. The accusations are often 
grounded on information provided by peers of the accused as a way of settling personal 
animosity or dispute. Within this large group, the signers of the Peace Petition 
represent stances similar to those taken by other activists in Turkish civil society, people 
with liberal professions (journalists and lawyers), activists of non-profit organizations 
and human rights organizations. All of them struggle against political oppression, 
discrimination against minorities, women and other marginalized groups and against 
the compromise of democracy in Turkey. However, as will be shown below, the petition 
signers are unique in their efforts to deal together with the implications of their protest 
on their routine lives, their position vis-a-vis the legal system and their academic 
agenda. 






Let us start by considering the backdrop on which the Peace Petition published in 
January 2016: 
AfP was founded in 2012 to advance a peaceful resolution of the prolonged conflict 
between the Turkish State and its Kurdish minority. In a nutshell, the Kurds are the 
largest ethnic minority in Turkey. As Sunni Muslims, they share a religious faith with 
the Turks. While they are not the only minority in Turkey, historical circumstances have 
caused their relationship with the Turkish regime to take an antagonistic turn since 
Turkey was established as a nation state (1923) on the ruins of the Ottoman Empire. At 
the end of World War I and the dissolution of the Empire, the victorious powers (Britain 
and France) established nation states in most of the formerly Ottoman territories, in line 
with their own political and economic interests in that region. The new nation states 
were structured with French or British colonial-mandatory regimes, respectively. 
Various religious and ethnic groups were compiled into these new political structures, 
which had little, if any, affinity with the former inter-communal structure or with the 
preceding regional geopolitical rationale. The colonial European rulers expected that 
new political entities would emerge inside the new borders they had charted and that 
with time, they would evolve into organic nation states. 
The dissolved empire had been a rich tapestry of religious and ethnic groups, all of 
which were subjects of the Muslim Ottoman dynasty. In the 19th century, the Ottoman 
dynasty and political elite set off an intricate and prolonged process of modifying the 
fundamental tenets of the state in attempt to modernize the Empire's government and 
society. The Ottoman government hoped that the reform would be a panacea for the 
separatist attempts of some religious or ethnic groups. This effort had continued to the 
very end of the Empire. While in the later years of the Empire the multi-communal 
fabric was unraveling, it helped usher in the concept of "minorities" and its associated 
politics into the Middle East. 
The Kurds, who had been promised by the British that they would receive their own 
nation state in northern Iraq and Syria, were left empty-handed and divided between 
some of the new states, chiefly Iraq, Syria and Turkey. Turkey, on the other hand, turned 
out to be the only new state that escaped colonial rule under Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk). 
From its first days as an independent republic to this day, all of Turkey's leaders 
regarded their Kurdish citizens as a threat. Worse still, the Kurdish threat, as they saw 
it, was further aggravated by the presence of the Kurdish communities of Syria and 
Iraq, east of the Turkish border. The various Turkish governments have invariably 
perceived any aspiration for Kurdish autonomy in eastern Turkey or appeal by Kurds 
to acknowledge their cultural and language rights in Turkey as a challenge to Turkish 
sovereignty. Meanwhile, the Kurds have not been sitting idle. Their collective national 
and cultural identity was fueled by their social and economic plight, which in turn, was 
due to the neglect of the regions in eastern Turkey, where many Kurdish citizens live. 
The military arm of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), which is active in eastern 
Turkey and in the Kurdish areas in northern Syria and Iraq is a belligerent guerrilla 
organization considered by Turkey, as well as by NATO, the European Community, 
the US and other countries to be a terrorist organization. Although the PKK adopted a 
non-violent policy during certain periods, it would be hard to overlook the violent 
nature of much of its struggle. 






In view of the above, Turkish governments have tended to react strongly to any 
criticism of their treatment of the Kurds or to repeated escalation of the Turkish-PKK 
conflict. Concurrently, citizens and organizations sensitive to issues of equality, 
democracy and minority rights in Turkey could not remain indifferent to the conflict. 
Up to a certain point, it seemed that in contrast to his predecessors in government, 
Erdoğan tended to employ a different, somewhat more constructive, attitude to the 
conflict with the Kurds. The establishment of AfP in 2012 may be understood against 
this background. The organization's work prior to the Peace Petition included such 
activities as comparative research and publications on peacemaking and cultural-
linguistic integration of minorities in various countries worldwide, organizing 
conferences on these topics, and advancement of gender equality. The organization 
highlighted the contribution of women to peacemaking around the world, and endorsed 
the negotiation between the Turkish government and the Kurdish organizations 
between 2013 and 2015. 
The very fact that negotiations were held must have sparked hope among AfP activists 
and Turkish citizens with similar stances. In practice, however, it seems that even 
before the collapse of the negotiations, a deep chasm had existed between the state's 
interpretation of an acceptable agreement with the Kurds and the goals set by Kurdish 
leaders. The government worked to obtain control over the conflict with the Kurds and 
to develop tools to manage it. The Kurdish movements, on the other hand, sought 
cultural autonomy. In fact, they even started exercising such autonomy in several towns 
in eastern Turkey. In the elections of June 2015, pro-Kurd Halkların Demokratik Partisi 
(HDP) succeeded in crossing the unusually high election threshold (10%) for entering 
the Turkish parliament. Erdoğan, in contrast, failed to obtain a sufficiently high 
majority for passing a constitutional amendment that would make him an omnipotent 
president with no need for a referendum. The Kurdish success seemed to shake the 
regular power imbalance between the government and the Kurds in the delicate 
negotiations between them. The talks finally collapsed following a terrorist action in 
July 2015 in Suruç on the Turkish-Syrian border. The terrorists targeted Turkish and 
Kurd activists who initiated a project of rebuilding a neighboring Syrian town, Kobane, 
the victorious stronghold of Kurdish fighters against ISIS. While it is believed that the 
terrorist act in Suruç was perpetrated by ISIS, PKK took revenge against Turkey by 
murdering two Turkish police officers. At that time, Turkey's interests on the border 
with Syria were complex. On the one hand, Turkey supported the war against ISIS, 
allowing thousands of refugees from Syria and Iraq to camp near the border. At the 
same time, Turkey feared that the victory over ISIS, achieved thanks to Kurdish efforts, 
combined with the civil war in Syria, would lead to the fulfillment of the Kurds' hope 
for a state of their own. This concern, in turn, contributed to Kurdish suspicions 
concerning the true agenda of the Turkish government. 
At the end of July 2015, the Turkish army launched a military campaign of 
unprecedented scale in the regions of east Anatolia, as if it were fighting an enemy 
army, not a civilian population of its own citizens. Hundreds of thousands of homes 
were demolished and their inhabitants forced to flee. Infrastructures were destroyed and 
neighborhoods turned into rubble. The citizens were held under prolonged curfews, 
unable to make a living, get water, food, medical aid to the injured or burial for the 






dead. Women were raped by soldiers, and civilians – men, women and children - were 
killed or injured in the shooting and bombardments. At the same time, the authorities 
prevented the transmission of information beyond the region or across Turkey's borders, 
shutting down newspapers and websites, detaining Kurdish journalists, political 
activists, governors and mayors. 
Helpless in face of the extreme violence, destruction and the gag on reports publicizing 
the horrors, AfP members drafted a petition calling to the government to cease the 
violence and return to the negotiation table. In response to the silencing forced upon 
them, they convened a press conference in which they publicized the petition, under the 
slogan we will not be a party to this crime. The press conference was successful in 
shattering the veil of silence, but the harsh reaction soon followed. 
 
II. The Reaction of the Turkish Regime to the Peace Petition 
Turkey's older, more established universities are State owned. They report to the 
government and to the council of higher education (YÖK). Academics employed in 
these universities are considered civil servants. Petition signatories working in public 
universities were summoned to disciplinary hearings, many of which resulted in their 
dismissal, annulment of their social benefits and pension plans, prohibition of 
employment in the public sector and in some cases, seizure of passports. In certain 
public universities, petition signatories lost their jobs on the same day, their offices 
were searched and they were forbidden to enter the campus. 
At the private universities and colleges, which have multiplied extensively across 
Turkey over the last decade, the reactions of senior managements have varied, largely 
in accordance with the positions of their funders. Each institution has reacted according 
to its respective perception of the petition, the importance it attaches to academic 
freedom and its willingness to withstand political pressure and continue employing the 
signatories. In practice, however, the petition signatories in these universities have been 
doomed to the same fate as their colleagues in public universities. The ostensibly lower 
rates of dismissal at private institutions can be ascribed to the different means used for 
ending signatories' employment. As contracts are personal, many governing councils 
have refrained from renewing signatories' contracts on allegedly academic grounds. 
Still, certain private institutions have chosen not to collaborate with the government's 
repressive policies. 
As mentioned above, the interrogations, detentions and dismissals started shortly after 
the petition was published, but increased considerably following the failed military 
coup and the announcement of a state of emergency in the summer of 2016. Filing 
criminal charges constituted the next stage in the process of criminalization. This tactic 
was set in motion in 2017, following the interrogation of some of the signatories by the 
public prosecutor’s office. In these interrogations, the prosecution pressed the 
academics to admit their support for PKK, in order to link their signatures on the 
petition to charges involving propaganda for a terrorist organization. Once filed, the 
charges led to criminal trials, which have been held in multiple criminal courts in 
Istanbul and in certain other cities as of December 2017. The bills of indictment cite 






the Anti-terrorism law (Law No. 3713), clause 7/2, which defines support for terrorist 
propaganda as a criminal offense. Also, the bills of indictment refer to Article 53 of the 
Penal Code (Law No. 5237), enabling the court to prohibit the accused who are found 
guilty from substantial civil rights. Alternately, some of the accused signatories have 
been indicted with degrading the Turkish Nation, the Turkish Republic and its organs, 
based on the Turkish Penal Code (Am. 2016; Art. 301/1). 
By June 2019, 739 of the petition signers have been subjected to legal proceedings. One 
hundred ninety-four cases have resulted in a ruling. In all of these, the court found the 
defendants guilty, sentencing them to 15-36 months of imprisonment. The judge has 
decided whether to carry out each sentence or suspend it based on procedural rules and 
a kind of negotiation in court. Initially, the prosecution focused on the first signatories, 
mainly those who work in 15 universities located in Istanbul. Next in line were 
academics from universities in other cities. Some of the defendants have announced 
they plan to appeal the verdict and are now waiting for an appeal date to be scheduled. 
One appeal, submitted by Professor Füsun Üstel, was heard in March but rejected. 
Professor Üstel has already been sent to jail for 15 months. 
It must be stressed that these legal proceedings do not meet the norms customary in 
law-abiding countries. Rather, they are emblematic political show trials. As such, they 
assume the appearance of proper proceedings while compromising the principle of rule 
of law, which in itself is a vague concept whose original meaning can be bent and 
distorted. It should be noted, in this context, that formally, Turkey is a democratic 
republic, despite the clearly authoritarian tendencies evident in Erdoğan's regime of the 
past few years. The republic exhibits a parliament, general elections, a constitution and 
many other attributes associated with liberal democracy. However, this is not the first 
time that the fragility of Turkish democracy appears in its fullest form. In recent years, 
it has been waning at an even faster pace while the appearance of liberal democracy is 
maintained. This in itself gives rise to questions that go beyond the formal definitions 
of democracy. Some commentators have explained this contradictory situation by 
describing Erdoğan’s authoritarian regime as "neo-Ottoman" (also echoing the 
pretensions and rhetoric of his party, the AKP). Nevertheless, these explanations 
manifest a profound misunderstanding of Turkey’s Ottoman past. Perhaps one could 
see some echoes of Ottoman legacies in Erdoğan’s early years in power through his 
development and welfare policy (which is also the title of his party, AKP). However, 
describing Erdoğan's early policy as neo-Ottoman (the prefix "neo" does not change the 
essence of the policy) makes no sense in the context of the realities of a nation state in 
the 21st century. The claim forwarded by such a description falls even further from the 
mark in the context of the clearly totalitarian present, which bears no resemblance to 
the imperial heritage. While the Ottoman sultans stopped at nothing when attempting 
to secure the continuity of their rule, their regime should be analyzed within the 
framework of their concrete historical circumstances. Besides, one must admit that their 
dynasty would not have existed for six consecutive centuries, surviving crises that other 
imperial dynasties failed to endure unless they excelled in striking some right political 
and social balances, demonstrating a great deal of pragmatism. 
 







III. Political Trials 
Several aspects of the trials of the signatories of the Peace Petition illustrate their 
futility in terms of implementation of the rule of law and reveal the political goals that 
they are meant to conceal. 
First and foremost is the use of anti-terrorism legislation in order to criminalize 
criticism and political protest, a tendency favored by regimes like Erdoğan's, including 
ones with an even more democratic image. In this case, the pattern is further underlined 
by the fact that the Turkish Penal Code includes a clause stating explicitly that 
"expression of an opinion for the purpose of criticism does not constitute an offence" 
(Art. 301/3). Criminalization of protest of the kind that democratic regimes are expected 
to contain and tolerate became quite common at the end of the 20th century. In the wake 
of the terrorist attack on the Twin Towers in New York in September 2001, the use of 
criminalization of this sort has practically gone viral. Many nations enact special anti-
terrorism laws, the need for which may be understandable. However, once enacted, 
these laws seem to acquire a life of their own, at times turning into an instrument of 
political oppression in a legalistic disguise. Erdoğan's regime obsessively accuses 
various political parties and groups of spreading terrorist propaganda whenever it faces 
criticism of its treatment of the Kurdish issue. Legitimate political criticism is often 
labelled as support for the attempted coup d'état of July 2016. 
The trials of the signatories of the Peace Petition are characterized by an inherent 
distortion of the letter of the law. In no way does the petition encourage violence or 
support terrorist organizations. In fact, it calls for the cessation of violence and for 
employing peaceful means to resolve the conflict with the Kurds, who are Turkish 
citizens. Not a single trial of the signatories has proven collaboration between AfP and 
any other subversive party, let alone a terrorist organization. These facts are highlighted 
time and again by the attorneys of the signatories and by the defendants themselves 
during the hearings. However, this lack of evidence hardly impresses the courts, and 
the government does not even bother to comment on these arguments. The prosecution 
has arbitrarily applied the definition of "terrorist propaganda" to the petition, and the 
judges take this definition for granted, turning it into their point of departure and 
completely ignoring defendants' claims that no evidence links the petition with the 
stipulations of the law under which they are indicted.  In other words, the prosecution 
dodges its duty to prove guilt, an elementary requirement of every criminal trial, by not 
providing any evidence to substantiate the link between the defendants' action and the 
definition of the relevant felony in the bill of indictment. Acquittal for lack of guilt or 
a not-proven verdict does not even seem to be considered as an option in these trials. 
Secondly, these legal hearings are being held simultaneously in several halls of the 
criminal court compound in Istanbul and other cities, each one with a different judge. 
Immediately at the end of trials, the judges announce that the defendants are found 
guilty and hand down the sentence. Denials made by the defendants in the hearings 
encounter the judges' complete disregard. Attorneys' statements about the pro-peace, 
anti-violence and civic nature of the defendants' activities, are completely ignored by 
the judges. In other words, while the defendants receive formal legal defense as required 






by law, the judges take no notice of the content of this defense, making up evidence out 
of thin air and concluding the hearing with formulaic announcements such as "it has 
been proven that..." and "Hence, we decided that…" Based on these invented grounds, 
they reiterate their decree and verdict. 
Thirdly, the rulings of the trials decided so far have sentenced many petition signers to 
15 months of imprisonment. Some cases involved longer sentences (up to three years), 
with more recent cases tending to exhibit harsher punishments. No legal logic or 
consistency is evident in the penalties or the length of imprisonment each judge chooses 
to impose (as part of the penalties stipulated in the penal code). No grounds for the 
sentences are given in the trials except for the arbitrary, general conclusion that the guilt 
of the defendants had been proven. In some cases, the judges list specific considerations 
when handing down the verdict, such as longer imprisonment because the defendant 
had not expressed remorse. Both the term of the imprisonment and the procedure that 
follows pronouncement of the sentence (see below) indicate that the trials are meant to 
intimidate the defendants, also serving as a warning sign to other citizens and academics 
who might be pondering participation in a civic protest. 
The automatic nature of the hearings and the rulings may be associated with the strong 
legalistic tradition in Turkey. Legal procedure may serve as a vital pillar in 
implementing the rule of law, provided that it is entrenched in a profound understating 
of its underlying logic. During its near Ottoman past (the 19th century), the legal elite 
in Istanbul and other cities of the empire demonstrated impressive professional and 
ideological determination in advancing a formalist legal culture. However, some 
hundred years after the establishment of the Turkish nation state, the legal proceedings 
of the criminal court system in Erdoğan's Turkey seem to have become an empty shell 
which one is expected to obey without further consideration. Notably, in this context, 
judges and jurists too have fallen victim to the recent political purge, with some losing 
their jobs. Moreover, the signers of the Peace Petition received letters of support from 
two unions of legal professionals – the Judges' union and the bar. Whether or not the 
judges presiding in these trials believe they are doing the right thing in conducting the 
trials in this manner, they certainly weigh their own personal calculations considering 
the fate of their colleagues who 'failed' to obey. 
A fourth aspect of the proceedings that indicates their futility is the implementation of 
rules that allow postponement of a formal announcement of the penalty when the 
penalty is lighter than two years in prison. The defendant is asked if s/he agrees that the 
announcement be postponed and whether s/he is planning to appeal. Under adequate 
legal proceedings, the right to appeal is a basic right of the defendant. In these trials, 
however, the defendants practically receive 'an offer they cannot refuse': when the 
sentence is shorter than two years of imprisonment, the defendant is entitled to postpone 
publication of the sentence provided that s/he waives her/his right to appeal. In 
exchange, the prison sentence turns into a suspended (or deferred) sentence, effective 
for five-years. In other words, opting for the right to appeal is practically perceived as 
provoking the prosecution and as retroactive proof that the sentence is justified. This is 
a Catch-22. Although so far none of the signatories who insisted on their right to appeal 
(other than Professor Üstel) has been given a date to appear before the court of appeal, 
no one seriously expects that these appeals will be upheld. Choosing to appeal is, in 







fact, more likely to result in immediate implementation of the prison sentence, 
following the appeal, or in an even harsher sentence. 
Under these circumstances, most of the defendants whose sentence has been decided 
choose to waive their right to appeal. They do so even though it is clear to them that the 
suspended sentence they receive in exchange may very well be implemented in the 
course of the next five years, in case the prosecution decides to indict them for a felony 
similar to the one for which they had been tried. If this happens, they will be retried and 
penalized for the later 'felony', in addition to implementation of the suspended sentence. 
Judging from their current experience, the defendants have no reason to assume the 
suspended sentence hanging over their heads will not be implemented arbitrarily. Still, 
the second option, namely opting for the right to appeal, is a much more difficult choice, 
in particular for people who are just beginning their academic career. Often, these 
people have young children who depend on them. Therefore, it is no coincidence that 
many of those who insist on appealing are academics in the more advanced stages of 
their career or who are even retired. This should not be understood to belittle or 
undervalue the incredible courage required to insist on appeal, regardless of the stage 
of one's career or life, considering the prospect of immediate imprisonment for an 
unknown length of time. Analogously, the decision to waive the right to appeal does 
not detract in the least from the civic courage displayed by those of the signatories who 
opt for this, or the insistent perseverance needed to keep on fighting for justice, equality 
and human rights in Turkey.  
 
IV. Solidary and Critical Academies 
No less remarkable and inspiring than the individuals who are performing these deeds, 
is the network of mutual support and solidarity sustained for the fourth year now, by 
this group of academics. During these years, the signatories have been enduring all 
forms of abuse, harassment and intimidation and the AfP has become the core of a 
resilient and creative support network which is also sustained by a range of other 
activists, professionals, artists, friends and family members. The criminal charges filed 
against them are a source of continued worry and anxiety, both because of the tough 
encounter with the legal system and due to the uncertainty that awaits them when 
rulings are handed down. The principle of trial's publicity, which the regime uses to 
transform the trials into a political show, allows AfP members to attend the hearings of 
their colleagues. Indeed, they show up, filling the court halls. Those who cannot find a 
vacant seat wait outside the hall to learn about the outcome of the hearing as soon as it 
ends. The defendants take advantage of the public attention and answer the questions 
directed at them with elaborate statements, explaining the nonsensical nature of the 
charges of promoting terrorism. They criticize the court strongly for its mistreatment of 
the rules of evidence and for inflicting penalties due to the legitimate exercise of 
freedom of speech and academic freedom. As soon as the hearing is over, the supporting 
AfP members take photos with their peers who are stranding trial and upload the photos 
to an online daily report and to websites covering the trials. One of the most effective 
websites is Bianet, which reports in Turkish, Kurdish and English on all acts of 
oppression, trials and dismissal of regime opponents. At the same time, AfP members 







protect those peers who prefer keeping a low profile given the vulnerability of their 
academic or personal situation. Their names, as well as details of their trials remain 
confidential. Conversely, those who decide to fight back openly, also on behalf of their 
peers, and decide to go public, allow publication of their statements to the court in 
English in hopes of gaining interest in international media and academic circles and 
mobilizing international support, which have recently become a very challenging task. 
In this context, it should be noted that this essay discloses no identifying information 
on the signatories and the leaders of various AfP actions who are prosecuted by the 
regime. It should be stressed that many of those AfP members who play an important 
role in the solidarity efforts are women, including well-known Turkish feminists. 
Another aspect of the solidarity around the signers of the Peace Petition, which has 
long-term implications is the establishment of working groups of dismissed academics 
who are cut-off from resources and tools of research. These groups, organized as 
solidarity academies outside of academic institutions, teach and supervise research 
students. While they cannot solve the economic difficulties of the scholars who have 
lost their jobs, these groups allow them to carry on with academic work through joint 
studying, ongoing interaction with students and training of research students, also 
alleviating the "social death" forced on them. It is important to note that on top of losing 
their jobs and academic positions, some of the signers of the Peace Petition also suffer 
from personal defamation on social media and threats for their lives. It appears that the 
persecution has already led one of the signers to commit suicide. Besides, to earn a 
living, some of them take the physical risks of becoming construction workers. 
The establishment of solidary academies is also motivated by long-term goals that go 
beyond the hardships of the dismissed and suspended scholars. They reflect a criticism 
of, and a challenge to, the current neo-liberal model of local and global academia. AfP 
has established several such solidary academies. One of them, located in Berlin, has 
attracted some of the signatories who left Turkey. These academies are experimental in 
nature and influenced by the different local circumstances of each working group. They 
look for ways to generate academic knowledge and research, teaching and training 
alongside free and egalitarian principles. In so doing, they seek to offer alternatives to 
contemporary neo-liberal academia by unraveling the power hierarchies typical of its 
institutions. 
These activities illustrate part of the ways in which AfP deals with the difficult fate of 
the Peace Petition signers. However, they also form part of the original academic and 
civic agenda of the organization, which from the outset motivated its members to work 
towards normalizing the relationship between the Turkish state and the Kurds in 
peaceful ways. Collecting signatures for the petition that calls for cessation of violence 
in east Turkey was one of the courses taken to advance this objective. On top of having 
to cope with dire personal situations and being forced to mobilize great personal 
courage when facing persecution by the government and the legal system, the 
signatories' determination in upholding their critical academic agenda testifies to their 
deep commitment to equality and democracy. It should be noted that intellectuals and 
academics in Turkey have been criticizing the regime and ultra-nationalistic trends in 
Turkey for many years, displaying courage and taking risks long before Erdoğan came 







to power. As such, the Peace Petition signers can be regarded as part of Turkeys' 
tradition of intellectual criticism and resistance. 
 
V. Non-Nostalgic Longing for the Empire… 
In conclusion, I would like to go back to my initial questions regarding the link between 
current developments in Turkey and their relatively near Ottoman past (the 'long' 19th 
century, until 1923), with which I am familiar from my research. In the late 20th century, 
historians of the Ottoman Empire challenged common historical narratives. Among 
others, they revised the common wisdom concerning the administrative and legal 
reforms instated in the Ottoman Empire of the 19th Century. This effort generated much 
progress in the research of socio-legal history. As part of this momentum, historians 
like myself have realized that the modern legal system introduced in the 19th Century 
by the Ottoman political and legal elite was quite successful and efficient (although far 
from perfect, like any other modern legal system). The reformed legal system, which 
comprised a broad network of jurists and officials, was founded on the concept of the 
rule of law. This understanding runs contrary to the descriptions provided by 
contemporary European observers who regarded the Ottoman reformed legal system as 
a failing attempt to create a superficial imitation of western legal systems. Obviously, 
the Ottoman legal system was not fault free, in fact presenting particular weaknesses 
shared by other legal systems that were modernized at the time (including those of 
Western Europe). 
In this context, reports on the extensive use of present-day Turkey's criminal justice 
system as a tool of political oppression and silencing have led me to raise questions 
about the transition from empire to nation state in Turkey. In 1923, an independent 
Turkish state was established in the former Ottoman Anatolia, defined as a secular 
republic. Its justice system, whose foundations are perhaps the most notable legacy of 
the Ottoman Empire, was based on two out of three judicial channels developed in the 
19th century by the legal elite: civil courts and criminal courts. The trials of the Peace 
petition signers are held in the latter courts under the penal code and the anti-terrorism 
law. 
In the 19th century, the principle of the rule of law, which assumes that everyone – 
regardless of their place in the social hierarchy – is equal before the law, was perceived  
by many across the globe as the clearest expression of the modern order. It emerged as 
an ideal of enlightenment and rationalism, almost as an interest- and power-free 
'operating system' whose mere implementation guaranteed that its goals would be met. 
This ideal may explain the strict adherence to procedures and bureaucracy, regarded by 
political and professional elites as necessary tools in applying a standard rule of law. 
The Ottoman political elite regarded the rule of law as a framework that reinforced its 
sovereignty and governance over the vast territories of the empire and the rich mosaic 
that was its population. A recent study shows that while reforms initiated by the 
Ottoman justice system were carried out rather successfully, power struggles in the 
higher echelons of the regime were manifested in the form of political trials. These 
trials exposed the fluid, vague nature of the notion of the rule of law. But there is 
nothing new or unique in distortions of the ideal of rule of law in those political trials. 







After all, power struggles are the bread and butter of political elites in all periods and 
regions. It is only natural, therefore, that they would take place in an arena strongly 
associated with and representative of the accumulation of political power. In the 
Ottoman Empire of the 19th century, this arena was the criminal justice system shaped 
by the principle of the rule of law. 
One may argue that the use of the criminal court and legal formalism render the political 
trials of the 19th century similar to the trials of the Peace Petition signers and of many 
other Turkish individuals under Erdoğan and his predecessors in Turkey. However, the 
balance of power in the trials of the Peace Petition signatories is very different from 
the one that shaped the political trials of 19th century-Ottoman Empire. The trials of the 
signatories and of many other citizens who resemble them do not represent power 
struggles within the ruling elite; the defendants are not political rivals trying to promote 
an alternative political grand design (although the prosecution accuses them of such 
schemes). Rather, these trials are held against a very large number of individuals, 
ordinary citizens, who pose no real threat to the regime. In fact, this group of individuals 
calls for nothing more than adhering to universal principles endorsed by all liberal 
democracies. The trials and the penalties imposed on the defendants aim to intimidate, 
to quell criticism, and to discipline the members of social and professional groups that 
may affect public opinion, generate knowledge and educate, even when these members 
have little to no influence.  
Based on my knowledge of the criminal justice system established with great efforts in 
the Ottoman empire of the late 19th century, the one thing that strikes me the most in 
these mass political trials is the use that the justice system is making of the principle of 
the rule of law. After all, the Founding Fathers of the Turkish republic came from the 
ranks of the Ottoman elite. Ottoman legal formalism was anchored in a philosophy that 
tied the rule of law with centralized modern justice. This justice system continued to 
exist once Turkey became a republic. The decision of Mustafa Kemal, the founder of 
the republic, to adopt a European civil code (the Swiss code, 1926) and separate religion 
from state, reinforced the attributes of the reformed Ottoman legal system, including 
the principles of the rule of law and equality before the law. Moreover, as a nation state, 
the Turkish republic was no longer required to find a middle ground between its multi-
ethnic structure and the nationalistic separatist aspirations of some of its communities 
(aspirations endorsed by European powers). Instead, it managed to impose the 
uniformity and centralization of its justice system. Ostensibly, these were optimal 
conditions for internalizing the rule of law and equality before the law by the judiciary 
and by ordinary citizens. However, judging by the trials of the Peace Petition signers 
and of many others, this does vehemently not seem to be the case in today's Turkish 
courts. It seems that a century of nation state culture and politics, a series of military 
coups-d'état and more recently Erdoğan's authoritarian regime have transformed legal 
procedure into an empty vessel of obtuse obedience. The so-called rule of law serves 
as a democratic fig leaf, concealing an Orwellian dictatorship. Many countries 
worldwide exhibit inherent weaknesses that highlight the fragility of the nation state as 
a structure capable of sustaining the rule of law in its most fundamental meaning. The 
inherent paradoxes of a global political order rooted in national communities have come 
to the forefront time and again during the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st. 







However, the inadequate support that this framework provides to the rule of law and 
democracy in Turkey, a nation state deeply ingrained in imperial political culture is 
particularly salient and especially disappointing. 
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